aanes_appreciator [he/him, comrade/them]

Welsh, Social Ecology and Jineology enjoyer, and computer programmer.

  • 39 Posts
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Joined 9 months ago
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Cake day: March 18th, 2025

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  • https://thecradle.co/articles/a-fifth-gen-frontier-algerias-su-57-signals-a-new-order-in-the-maghreb

    The Cradle is usually semi-reliable depending on the topic, but this feels a bit like the whole “Iranian SU-35” meme all over again. Would Russia even permit SU-57s to be exported in operationally-significant numbers considering how useful they’d be versus Ukranian air defences?

    Excerpt: What Algeria gets and what it doesn't

    The Su-57 delivered to Algeria will differ from the version flown by Russia’s elite squadrons, as export fighters almost always do. Any differences are likely to be found in engines, electronics, and software access, not in the aircraft’s basic airframe.

    On the Russian side, the ‘full’ Su-57 is built around a stealth-leaning airframe with internal weapons bays, an AESA radar complex (N036 Byelka) with multiple antenna arrays, a powerful IRST, 360-degree defensive sensors, and eventually the new “second-stage” engine known as Izdeliye 30.

    Export aircraft, by contrast, are almost certain to fly with the earlier AL-41F1-series engines: still capable of supercruise and 3D thrust vectoring, but without the same fuel efficiency and thrust margin Russia is chasing for later domestic blocks.

    The more significant downgrades are invisible. Avionics and sensor-fusion software determine what the aircraft can actually do with the data its sensors collect. Certain radar modes, electronic-intelligence libraries, and parallel-processing capabilities are unlikely to be included in export builds. Electronic-warfare packages and datalinks will similarly be sanitized, with fewer jamming techniques loaded and tighter controls over encryption and waveforms.

    Weapons integration is also controlled. While the Su-57 is designed to carry a broad suite of standoff and anti-radiation missiles internally, export versions will not include nuclear roles, and the longest-range or most sensitive systems may be withheld.

    Stealth coatings, too, differ. Russia retains its most sensitive materials for domestic units, with export variants tuned to be slightly less demanding and slightly less classified.

    Still, the Su-57E represents a generational leap for Algiers – a level of capability unmatched in the region.


  • For advanced stuff sure, but AKs aren’t a big deal for the big Satan. Besides, if we know Iran and China is shipping AKs, so does the US.

    If anything, Maduro WANTS these shipments known to the US, especially its lackeys who are chomping at the bit to follow Trump’s coat tails into Caracas. The US grunts won’t be recipient of Chinese-Iranian leaded justice in this potential confrontation, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, etc. are all watching closely to see if they’ll be welcomed as liberators or sent packing.

    Everything right now IMO points to the US playing the Iran gambit again. blockade and buildup for what appears to be a “hot war” while isolating the target until its attack dogs get their affairs in order and get ready to bite. Then, the US will commit to a decapitation strike and open the country to a prolonged engagement with its regional rivals who will do the dirty work.

    Those rumoured “5000 MANPADS”, for example, are of absolutely zero consequence to the US combined fleet. To an outdated Argentinian F-16 (or even A-4 Skyhawk) with undertrained pilots and little-to-no SEAD? A true threat, not unlike how the US lost zero aircraft to the Houthis (directly) whilst the SGC forces suffered a few… embarrasing moments when improvised truck-launched R-77s splashed their last-gen UK/US shitboxes.

    If Argentina et al. are scared to march in, Trump’s campaign will fall flat even with a hit on Maduro. If the US doesn’t take point, the vassals won’t follow. Both need to be capable of victory in their theatres to make the next stage worth pursuing.



  • It would track with Russian doctrine of recent to start bombarding the escape route, but not fully closing it, to encourage a rout rather than engaging a pocket directly. The entire campaign to Pokrovsk was done like this, plus Toretsk and Kursk (namely the final push out to Sumy oblast). Im sure there are others too.

    If the bridge falls, the defenders have their decision made for them, and could removedthe NATO generals into a harsh reaction. Instead, the bridge is still useful for retreating but will be slower, meaning HVTs will be vulnerable. Plus, it signals the fact that Russian airpower can collapse the bridge if it chooses to: Geraniums and Iskanders are much less difficult to intercept than a flanker-launched Kinzhal. Anywhere a Geranium can land without interception, so could a KAB-1000 or Kinzhal in due course, and Ukraine is well aware of this insinuation.

    This is like when you lean a little bit to get the cat off your lap on its “own accord” rather than risk a lovebite trying to pick it up awkwardly. At worst, the cat won’t budge and you’ll just scroll for a while and try again.