I want to mainly use it for privacy over its “security”. I don’t know what makes everyone fine with running it on fucking google pixels. Is there some kind of “low security” version or something for other phones? I’m so tired of certain organizations infiltrating privacy communities and making people believe in improving “security” by voluntarily giving up on privacy and using even non free software like that insecurities blog and other people.

  • jetAEnglish
    22·
    8 months ago

    https://grapheneos.org/faq#recommended-devices

    Non-exhaustive list of requirements for future devices, which are standards met or exceeded by current Pixel devices:

    Support for using alternate operating systems including full hardware security functionality

    Complete monthly Android Security Bulletin patches without any regular delays longer than a week

    At least 5 years of updates from launch for phones (Pixels now have 7) and 7 years for tablets

    Vendor code updated to new monthly, quarterly and yearly releases of AOSP within several months to provide new security improvements (Pixels receive these in the month they’re released)

    Linux 5.15 or Linux 6.1 Generic Kernel Image (GKI) support

    Hardware accelerated virtualization usable by GrapheneOS (ideally pKVM to match Pixels but another usable implementation may be acceptable)

    Hardware memory tagging (ARM MTE or equivalent)

    BTI/PAC, CET or equivalent

    PXN, SMEP or equivalent

    PAN, SMAP or equivalent

    Isolated radios (cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC, etc.), GPU, SSD, media encode / decode, image processor and other components

    Support for A/B updates of both the firmware and OS images with automatic rollback if the initial boot fails one or more times

    Verified boot with rollback protection for firmware

    Verified boot with rollback protection for the OS (Android Verified Boot)

    Verified boot key fingerprint for yellow boot state displayed with a secure hash (non-truncated SHA-256 or better)

    StrongBox keystore provided by secure element

    Hardware key attestation support for the StrongBox keystore

    Attest key support for hardware key attestation to provide pinning support

    Weaver disk encryption key derivation throttling provided by secure element

    Insider attack resistance for updates to the secure element (Owner user authentication required before updates are accepted)

    Inline disk encryption acceleration with wrapped key support

    64-bit-only device support code

    Wi-Fi anonymity support including MAC address randomization, probe sequence number randomization and no other leaked identifiers